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University of Florida Law Review
VoLUME XXXI
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NUMBER 4

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
A MEASURE OF INHERENT TRANSIENCE
JosEPH W. LrrrIE*

In a recent issue of the Review, two of my colleagues wrote an article entitled Board of Regents v. Bakke: The All-American Dilemma Revisited that
sweepingly justified affirmative action on grounds of what they describe as
"social justice."I This justification was offered to support their particular
resolution of what they see as the "All-American Dilemma," namely, to provide
"social justice" to a disadvantaged racial class in a form that infringes upon the
rights of individual members of a majoritarian class.
I have no quarrel with the correctness of affirmative action in appropriate
context nor with the desire to see it justified. Affirmative action has no more
claim than any other "correct" public policy to stand on its own ipse dixit.
What I do quarrel with is the failure of my colleagues to give more weight in
their balance to the interests of individual members of the majority,2 their
failure to expose the multifaceted aspects of affirmative action, 3 and most important, their failure to recognize that the doctrine is one that necessarily
implies temporary application. 4 This article dwells on the last point and maintains that an end to affirmative action must be planned for, because, as shall
be demonstrated, the legal justification must necessarily fall away if the program is effective.

*B.A. 1957, Duke University; M.S. 1961, Worcester Poly. Inst.; J.D. 1963, Michigan; Professor of Law, Holland Law Center, University of Florida.
1. Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: An All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30
U. FLA. L. R1v. 843 (1979). The authors flatly state that they "interpret affirmative action to
be a theory of social justice." Id. at 845.
2. First, the authors argue that governmental decisions made on grounds of race against
a white person in favor of a black is not "racial discrimination" because of the absence of a
history of social ostracism. Id. at 856-60. Then they seem to argue that racial justice means
that the individual interests of an offended white person always will be balanced against the
entire history of racial inequity visited upon blacks as a racial group. Id. at 860-63. Herein is
a revisitation of the quaint colonial concept of the "white man's burden."
3. Apart from discussing the Bakke facts the authors make no effort to discuss affirmative
action in context.
4. The authors detect, without grasping its significance, the emergence of the temporary
character of affirmative action, referring to it as "new conservatism." Baldwin & Nagan, supra
note 1, at 844. Viewing this as a rejection of the concept, rather than as a recognition of its
transience, the authors spend considerable effort describing how bad things still are for blacks.
Id. at 845-48. To the extent that they mean only that the time for ending affirmative action is
not yet upon us, they are correct.
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SETTING THE STAGE FOR AFFRMATIVE ACTION

Let me begin by defining what I mean by affirmative action. First, I am
speaking of acts that raise a question of constitutional dimension under either
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution or the due process equivalent of the fifth amendment. Hence, I
am referring to acts that are imposed or required by governmental action.
Moreover, these acts must intend to give an advantage in economic opportunities (usually in terms of job placement or admission to an educational
institution) to persons possessing "preferred" racial, gender, or religious characteristics that have been denominated as "suspect" (except for gender) in the
parlance of equal protection analysis. Finally, these explicit preferences must
operate to exclude persons of equal or superior objective qualifications who do
not possess the suspect characteristic. Not included within this definition are
laws that outlaw discrimination and programs in the nature of a "head start"
that make compensatory job training or education available to anybody who
is disadvantaged. So long as such a program is open to all comers, it does not
raise the affirmative action question even though participants possessing a
suspect characteristic make up a disproportionately large share of the student
body.
Although affirmative action questions have arisen in two seemingly different contexts, education and employment, the underlying issues are essentially identical in their primary thrust, which is to facilitate access to
economic opportunity. DeFunis v. Odegaard5 and Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke" were cases in which state educational institutions set aside
spaces in entering classes of professional schools to be filled only by persons
possessing certain suspect characteristics. Because the total numbers of students
that could be admitted in any class were absolutely limited, some prospective
students who were not in the target group (that is, not possessing the suspect
characteristics) applied and were excluded and, as it happened, at least some
of them possessed superior objective qualifications than did some of the affirmative action admittees. By contrast, cases like United States v. Lathers Local 46 7
and Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Shultz," employed
court ordered hiring programs with the goal of producing a government designated proportion of blacks and whites in populations of construction workers.
To achieve the sought for proportions, the courts imposed hiring schemes that
selected people on the basis of a suspect characteristic. For example, in Lathers
the employer was ordered to hire one black person for each white person employed until the designated black-white mix was met.
Because employment cases have a richer diversity than the education cases,
I will use the employment context to bring out what I believe to be the central
issues in discrimination remedies in general and affirmative action in particular. First, I argue that actual past discrimination of some kind is an absolute
5.
6.
7.
8.

416
438
471
442

U.S. 312
U.S. 265
F.2d 408
F.2d 159

(1974).
(1978).
(2d Cir. 1973).
(3d Cir. 1971).
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condition precedent to any remedy. 9 In taking this stand, I firmly reject the
notion that the mere presence of racial imbalances in work force or student
populations invites the State to step in and change the racial mix. Such imbalances may provide evidence that historic deprivation has existed, but they
do not necessarily prove it.10 I assume that various racial, ethnic, and gender
imbalances can occur naturally in the absence of invidious discrimination and
that when those do occur they create no basis for a remedy for any person.11
Without discrimination, no harm has been done anyone. The converse point
of view would envelop the State in social manipulation that would be endless
and totally repugnant to many, if not most, people. On this point I adhere to
the views of Mr. Justice Douglas who said:
The State ... may not proceed by racial classification to force strict
population equivalences for every group in every occupation, overriding
individual preferences. The Equal Protection Clause commands the
elimination of racial barriers not their creation
in order to satisfy our
1 2
theory as to how society ought to be organized.
Hence, past discrimination is the sine qua non of affirmative action.
This does not imply, however, that each complainant must prove a specific
act in which he was singled out as a target of discriminatory animus. That
would meet but a fraction of the remedial demands that history has thrust upon
us. Instead, I would identify a hierarchy of discriminatory forces that range
from sharpest focus to most attenuated, as follows:
(i) Specific victims of explicit acts of overt discrimination in particular
employment decisions.
(ii) Specific victims of implicit acts of discrimination in particular employment decisions.
(iii) Persons who have not been specific victims of discriminatory acts in
employment decisions, but who are members of a class that has been
historically victimized by the particular employer.
(iv) Persons who have not been specific victims of discriminatory acts in
employment decisions and whose class has not been victimized by
the particular employer, but who do not compete successfully for
jobs because they are members of a class that has been victimized in
cultural opportunities that prepare people for employment.
9. One court imposed a two-fold test: "a clear cut pattern of long-continued and egregious
racial discrimination" and a remedy that is not "concentrated upon a relatively small,
ascertainable group of non-minority persons." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v.
Local 638, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
10. The use of statistics in proving discrimination has almost become a jurisprudence of
its own in equal employment litigation. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.. 324 (1977).
11. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said as much in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). Violations of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause require an improper

motive. Not everyone would agree with this. Further reflection reveals, however, that natural
processes regularly distribute populations in expectable deviations from perfect statistical
proportionalities. The law surely should not undertake to force every population into a rigid
proportional mold.
12. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 US. 312, 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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So far as I am concerned, deprivations of any of these varieties gives rise to
a justifiable remedy. To me, that is self-evident. Far from self-evident, however,
is when and if affirmative action is the appropriate remedy. This is where the
individual rights aspect of the "individual rights - social justice" dilemma
posed by my colleagues enters the picture. My dispute with their approach is
that they did not resolve the dilemma; they ignored it. Having asserted that
something in the nature of a trade-off had to be made, they promptly dropped
the interest of individual rights and spent their time justifying social justice,
which of itself hardly needs justification. I propose to fill out the neglected side
of the argument by examining various remedies in terms of how their burdens
are distributed.
Just as sources of deprivation vary from sharp focus to general impact, so
too do the burdens of various remedies fall in a spectrum from general to
specific impact. Thus, a hierarchy of burden bearers can be defined as follows:
(i) Wrongdoers, meaning those people, including employers, unions,
employees, etc., who have participated in discriminatory acts against
identifiable victims or classes in employment decisions.
(ii) Society at large, whose members are collectively responsible for historical patterns of invidious discrimination in employment and in
cultural opportunities that affect preparedness for employment.
Many people, of course, would be free of individual animus or of
direct implication in particular acts of discrimination.
(iii) Innocent members of the non-target classes who will be singled out
for economic detriment as a result of a remedy given a victimized
person or class. The detriment might arise in a number of forms,
such as giving greater seniority to black workers who had been
denied jobs before obtaining a remedy then possessed by white
workers with earned seniority; or affording preferential hiring to
equally or less well qualified specific victims of past discrimination;
or bumping a white worker from a job in favor of a specific victim
of past discrimination; or favoring persons who are members of
victimized classes, but who were not specific victims themselves.
A legal and social culture imbued with the concept of fault should always
award a remedy when its burden falls only upon a specific wrongdoer, as where
an employer is required to hire and pay back wages to a victim of discrimination. These remedies are authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641s and the Supreme Court has approved them even when the prospective
worker never actually applied for a job because he knew correctly that he
would have been denied employment. 14 Proofs of "would have" applied "butfor" correct knowledge of certain discrimination seldom will be easy, but the
law allows victims to try. More to the point, when a remedy of back pay, an
order to hire, or make-up seniority (not including competitive seniority) is
given, it does not have an unfair impact upon any innocent white worker. The
black worker simply assumes the "rightful place" he would have occupied in
the absence of discrimination.
13.
14.

§706(g), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1976).
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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In other instances, the remedy may fall upon the public at large, as where
taxpayers provide special programs that do not have an exclusionary effect.
This remedy is appropriate to ameliorate and cure both specific and general
deprivations, 15 even though innocent members of the public must carry a portion of the collective load. "Social justice" truly supports it.
Finally, sometimes a remedy falls specifically upon persons who are innocent
of any personal acts of discrimination. Even though this is the general remedial
model that begs hardest for justification, not every specific remedy that falls
upon so-called innocent victims is inappropriate. For example, suppose two
prospective workers, one black and one white, applied for employment with
the same employer on the same day. Suppose further that the white was hired
but the black rejected solely because of his race. Suppose, finally that the black
later was awarded a job remedy by a court. If the black were totally qualified,
would it be proper to put him in a job equivalent to that now occupied by his
white counterpart and also give him competitive seniority equal to that of the
white as if he had been on the job during the intervening years? This remedy
would equate the black with his exact counterpart and place him in a position
superior to that of the innocent workers that had been hired after his illegal
rejection. In my mind the remedy is unquestionably proper. Indeed, it does
not raise the affirmative action remedy because no one is displaced from a
secured position. Indeed, in placing the black in the job he would have held
"but for" the wrong done him, a remedy explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court in Franksv. Bowman TransportationCo.,6 the remedy is nothing more
than a version of typical tort reparation principles.
What happens, however, when the next step is taken; that is an innocent
worker is "bumped" in one form or the other. One example is to give a job to
a specific black victim of discrimination in favor of an equally qualified innocent white when both are applying for the job. This, too, represents a
variant of the torts reparation concept and raises no critical affirmative action
question. But for the wrongful act, the black would have already been on the
job. Franks and numerous other cases approve this remedy. But what of a
situation in which a victim of discrimination lays claim to a job held by a
innocent white who was hired after the black was victimized and who has since
gained an advanced job that the black is also qualified to hold? If the black
had not been victimized in the first place, he would have been senior to the
white. Would it be appropriate to bump the white into an entering level job
and replace him with the black? This is affirmative action. It contains the indispensable quality of depriving an innocent person of a valuable status that
15. School busing to remedy segregated schools is the prototypical example.
16. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Court justified its holding saying:
Mhe result which we reach today- which standing alone, establishes that a burden of the
past discrimination is presumptively necessary -is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction particularly when considered in light of our traditional
view that '[a]ttainment of a great national policy ... must not be confined within narrow
canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies'. Id. at 777-78 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941)).
The Court did not however, suggest that bumping would be an appropriate remedy. Three

justices dissented to the make whole competitive seniority remedy.
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he has earned. Nevertheless, I will not use this model to examine the constititional questions raised by it because it is not a remedy that the federal courts
employ. This "freedom now" remedy was rejected as long ago as 1969 in Local
189, United Papermakers& Paperworkersv. United States.17 The federal courts
have been unwilling to bump ensconced white workers, saying instead that the
black worker was entitled only to his "rightful place," meaning a job and appropriate competitive seniority.
If the courts won't bump innocent whites in favor of specific black victims
of employment discrimination, it stands to reason that white workers won't be
bumped in favor of members of classes victimized by historic and cultural racial
biases.' Hence, that model may be set aside, bringing us to this question.
Would it be proper in making hiring decisions to discriminate on grounds of
race in favor of people who have never been specific targets of discrimination
but are of classes whose members have been victimized by a particular employer, or generally deprived of cultural opportunities that affect job preparedness?
An affirmative action remedy to correct the first of these circumstances has
been approved under Title VII on numerous occasions. Indeed, in Davis v.
County of Los Angeles' 9 Judge Tuttle recently observed:
Eight Courts of Appeal . . . have considered and approved the use of
accelerated hiring goals or quotas to eradicate the effects of past discrimination .... While the defendants argue [that] Title VII, forbids
the imposition of racial quota hiring, even were this to be an order
premised solely on Title VII, we note this view has been uniformly
re20
jected by the many courts which have considered the question.
Davis went so far as to hold that the blacks favored in the hiring process
need not be the precise victims of the past discrimination, so long as discrimination had been practiced in the past to exclude blacks from the employer's work
force.21 Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutional aspects of this remedy, it seems to have approved it implicitly in the
Franks case.22 The situation meets the sine qua non test of prior discrimination
by an employer, thereby artificially producing a racially imbalanced work force.
Furthermore, the remedy is closed in the sense that it operates only until some
specified goal has been satisfied.
17. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. Even the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979) apparently would not approve this remedy. The Weber majority said:
[t]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees. The plan does
not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement wth blacks.... Nor does
the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of those
trained in the program will be white. Id. at 2730. For further discussion of Weber see notes
25-73 infra.
19. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 1842-43.
21. Id. at 1343.
22. See text accompanying note 16 supra. See also Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss4/1

6

Little: Affirmative Action: A measure of Inherent Transience

1979]

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

At the time my colleagues wrote their article, the Supreme Court had not
decided an affirmative action case in which only a generalized cultural deprivation claim of discrimination had been made. In fact, at the time they wrote the
23
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,
appeared to set the law as explicitly rejecting any such remedy under Title VII
when the employer "has not been guilty of any discriminatory hiring or promotion at its... plant." 2 4 In a widely publicized opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit, thereby taking affirmative action in employment to
its furtherest extreme to date.
THE

Weber DECIsiON

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 25 may be a mere digression because it purports to answer no fundamental question about affirmative action.
Indeed, the four-member majority opinion (only seven justices participated)
emphasized that "the narrowness" of its inquiry precluded examination of
constitutional issues. 26 Yet, as the discussion below brings out, there is a certain
beguiling quality about the Weber case that may give precedential importance
to its rejection of a record of past discrimination as the sine qua non of affirmative action. Despite that, however, even the Weber majority imposed limitations
on the affirmative action remedy that help make my main point; notably that
affirmative action is necessarily a transient measure.
In Weber, an employer and union had voluntarily agreed to institute an
affirmative action job improvement plan. No suit had been filed and no court
order was issued against anyone. Indeed, the parties to the agreement asserted
that there had never been employment discrimination at the plant. Despite the
Court's apparent acceptance of this claim, certain facts and statements in the
opinions belie its accuracy. For example, the employer's craft work force was
only 1.8 percent black; whereas, the work force in the area was 39 percent black.
Moreover, the wording of the Weber majority and concurring opinions suggest
that the justices saw a ruse. The Weber majority says the plan was developed
"to eliminate traditional patterns of racial discrimination" 27 and to "open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."28 And, in concurrence, Mr. Justice Blackmun candidly
acknowledges that the employer's "past hiring practices may be subject to
question 29 and he points out certain background factors, discussed below, that
undermine the premise of no past discrimination. Discrimination was "in the
air, so to speak," if nothing else. And surely it was a position of vulnerability,
plus what was less than gentle prodding by a federal agency, that caused the
employer and union to impose the affirmative action plan. By doing so, they

23. Id.
24. Id. at 224.
25. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
26. Id. at 2726.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2730 (quoting 110 CoNG. Rac. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).

29. Id. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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may have been buying off claims and law suits. More will be said of this below.
In any event, all these factors repose sub silento in the case, and perhaps,
attenuate its meaning. Still, the majority did not openly acknowledge that the
case involved a history of past discrimination. The Weber decision, therefore,
must be taken as one that faced the no-past-discrimination issue head on.
Weber, a white, was denied an opportunity to participate in a job improvement program in favor of a less senior black who himself was not a victim of
past discrimination by the employer. Both the job improvement program and
the "race conscious" assignment scheme were part of an affirmative action plan
voluntarily adopted by Kaiser, the employer, and Weber's union. Weber
brought suit claiming that the employer violated Sections 703 (a) and (d) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because the precise statutory wording
must be seen to evaluate the quality of the Weber opinion, portions of those
sections are presented as follows:
Sec. 703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) .

..

to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or
(2) . . . to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or

otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, [or]
labor organization . . . to discriminate against any individual because

of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.
Section 703(j)3 1 also figured prominently in the opinion. Hence, it too, is
presented in part:
(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any
employer [or] labor organization . . . to grant preferential treatment

to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by any employer ....

or admitted to, or employed in, any apprentice-

ship or other training program, in comparison with the total number of
percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
Weber's case was straightforward and simple; he was rejected because he
was white. Places in the job training program were open only for blacks. This
would seem to be patently unlawful under the Title VII, and both lower courts

30. 43 U.S.c. §2000e-2(a), 2(d) (1976).

31.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1976).
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2
so ruled although Circuit Judge Wisdom, author of the seminal Local 1893

33
eliminate-present-effects-of-past-discrimination opinion dissented.
In what dissenting Mr. Justice Rehnquist described as a "tour de force
reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but of escape
artists such as Houdini,"34 the majority of four justices read a hole into sections
703(a) and (d), saying that the prohibition reposing there "does not condemn
all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans."35 Namely, it
does not protect innocent whites against discrimination in favor of equally
innocent blacks when to do so opens "employment opportunities for Negroes
in occupations which have been traditionally dosed to them."38 No great advantage may be gained by reciting the details of the majority's rather brief
justification; nor, indeed, Rehnquist's longer dissenting opinion. Both opinions
marshall legislative history to support their claims; by the majority, that
Congress intended an exception for voluntary affirmative action; by the dissent,

that Congress intended no such thing. Interested readers may themselves ex-

amine the originals. Nonetheless, it is worth noting how section 703(j), quoted
above, figured in the majority's rationale. The argument goes, in effect, that
Congress specifically deprived courts of the authority to order preferential

relief, but did not in express words deprive employers and unions of the power
to enter voluntary affirmative action agreements. Thus, Congress must have
intended them to have that freedom.
Plainly, this is a version of expressio unis est exclusio alterius, but a corrupted one. The wording of sections 703(a) and (d) shows the absurdity of the
argument on its face. A central purpose was to outlaw agreements between
employers and unions that advanced the interests of workers of one race at the
expense of another. One need only read Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 37
to gain the proper historic perspective on that point. Then when one is informed, as by Rehnquist's opinion, that section 703(j) was adopted for the
express purpose of quieting fears that had arisen in the minds of some members
of Congress as to how far courts might go in remedying sections 703(a) and (d)
violations, the true shabbiness of the argument emerges. Beyond this, if one

32. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969).
33. Strongly reminiscent of my colleagues' defense of affirmative action, Wisdom argued:

A person's color should not be relevant to most decisions. This court knows that acceptance
of that principle did not come easily. At this stage in the history of eliminating racial discrimination, the use of a racial criterion because it is "benign" pulls us perilously dose to
self-contradiction. But in spite of our newly adopted equality, the persuasive effects of
centuries of societal discrimination still haunt us. [The plan being litigated is reasonable]
to remedy some of those effects in employment practices. Their actions may or may not be
just to all employees; they may or may not be wise; but I believe they are legal.
Weber v. Kaiser Alum. &Chem. Corp., 563 F-2d at 239 (1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
34. 99 S. Ct. at 2737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2730. Four justices joined in a majority opinion, Justice Blackmun concurred;
the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist dissented; Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate.
36. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REGc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
37. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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reads the series of Supreme Court opinions from Griggsv. Duke Power Co. 38 to
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters89 one will see the Court struggling,
against the manifest conservatism of the Congress that enacted Title VII, to
give the law ample scope to outlaw subtle and even unintended discrimination
when overt acts were absent and to accommodate the often competing interests
of victims of discrimination and innocent whites. Nothing one reads would
lead him to suspect that an invisible hole looms in the "thou shalt not discriminate" injunction, merely awaiting the voluntary agreement of employers
and unions to correct old wrongs as they see them.
Agreeing with the ends but uncomfortable with the means of the majority,
Mr. Justice Blackmum in his concurrence admitted "misgivings . . . concerning the extent to which the legislative history of Title VII clearly supports the
result the Court reaches today."40 That result, according to Blackmun, was "an
interpretation of Title VII that permits affirmative action by an employer
whenever the job category in question is 'traditionally segregated.' "41 Rather
than join the dissent, which Blackmun deemed to be somewhat overreaching
in its search for opposing legislative history,42 Blackmun concurred, on grounds
that "strong considerations of equity support an interpretation of Title VII
that would permit private affirmative action to reach where Title VII does
not."

43

Blackmun's opinion, resting uneasily between the majority and the dissents,
illuminates two grave faults that I see in the ruling of the Court. One is the
question of statutory construction. I am not so hidebound as to submerge
reason and common sense beneath some unthinking legal shibboleth, such as
the "rule of law, not men," but I worry about the discipline of the bench, the
bar and especially of litigants when the most prestigious court in the land
adjusts history in order to imprint its own theory of social policy on the law.
I am not talking about construing the Constitution; that document must grow
and stretch as times change and the litigation before the Supreme Court is the
way it is done. But Title VII is a statute and Congress meets almost continuously, remolding laws as it sees fit. When the Court construes Title VII to
be contrary to the policy Congress wants to embrace, then Congress can amend
the statute, as it recently did to change the Court's interpretation in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.44 One might respond by saying, "All right, if Congress
does not like Weber, it can change it." Maybe it will, but I doubt it. As a
matter of political realty I do not believe Congress could have amended Title
38. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albermaxle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 US.
405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

39. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
40. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2732.
42. Id. at 2733.

43. Id.
44. 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (held that a medical benefits plan for employees that did not
provide pregnancy benefits did not violate Title VII; Congress amended Title VII by 1977
amendments to require such benefits).
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VII to produce the Weber result had the Court agreed with the dissenters; nor
do I believe it can now change Weber. The Court saw a chance to legislate and
tookit.
Erosion of discipline in the law, bench, and bar undoubtedly destablizes
the law, and, ultimately, inflicts an unbalancing vertigo in the economic, social
and political affairs of the people. Weber sets a poor example, no matter how
well motivated the doers of the deed. In choosing to protest by quoting Benjamin Cardozo, Chief Justice Burger made the point most compellingly:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the
social life. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that
remains. 45
More embarrassing to the Court than criticism that its approach erodes the
stability of the law will be the almost sure-to-come realization that the Weber
opinion puts it in a box with no easy way out. Future law suits will force the
Court either to rewrite history on an even grander scale, or limit Weber narrowly, because of the Court's prior construction of section 1981 of Title 42 of
the United States Code, a post-Civil War law enacted under the authority of
the thirteenth amendment. Stated in full, section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State or Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 41
Until the Supreme Court issued its seminal opinion in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.,4 holding that the early civil rights laws prohibited private as well
as governmental discrimination, this statute had lain more or less dormant for
almost 100 years. After Jones, litigants began to use section 1981 to seek redress from employment discrimination. These actions have several important
advantages vis-a-vis Title VII: neither deferment to state fair employment
laws 48 nor exhaustion of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative remedies49 is required, and a broader range of remedies is available.50
45. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285 n.15 (1976) (quoting
B. CAmozo, Tnm NATURE OF THm JUDICiL PRocss 141 (1921)).
46. 42 US.C. §1981 (1976).

47. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(d), 42 US.C. §2000e-5(d) (1976). See Love v. Pullman
Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).

49. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(b), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) (1976). See, e.g., EEOC v. Zia,
582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
50. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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Despite these advantages, because section 1981 was enacted under the authority
of the thirteenth amendment, doubts were once raised as to whether or not it
protected white people against job bias, or only black. Emphatically putting
those doubts aside in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 51 a
majority of seven justices 52 brushed aside the argument that section 1981 was
for "Blacks only," saying:
[W]e cannot accept the view that the terms of §1981 exclude its application to racial discrimination against white persons. On the contrary,
the statute explicitly applies to "all persons" (emphasis added), including white persons.
[The Court continued with a detailed examination of legislative history, concluding as follows:]
The cumulative evidence of congressional intent makes clear, we
think, that the 1866 statute, designed to protect the "same right ... to
make and enforce contracts of citizens of every race and color" was not
understood or intended to be reduced ...

to protection solely of non-

whites. Rather, the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the
making or enforcement of contracts against, or in
53
favor of, any race.

Perhaps a court might side-step Weber's own case under section 1981 on
grounds that the apprenticeship program in question was not a right of contract, but was a beneficence of the employer that he might grant or withhold
at his own pleasure. That would be shabby, and Weber sets a tone of shabbiness; but how is a discrimination at the point of initial hiring going to be got
around? There is no section 1981 parallel to section 703(j) of Title VII and the
Court has already explicitly held that Title VII did not repeal section 1981 by
implication." Hence, it will be extremely difficult for the Court to manipulate
"expressio unis" as it did in Weber. Will it revise its own version of the legislative history of section 1981 and amend the statement quoted above to read:
"the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race, until this court
changes its mind, which it now does to favor blacks?"5
51. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
52. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not join the majority's opinion on
the point because "they [did] not agree that §1981 [was] applicable in this case." 427 U.S. at
297 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 288-96 (emphasis added).
54. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454: (1975).
55. 427 U.S. at 288 (underlined material added). Despite the strength of this analysis, it
is to be doubted that the conflict between Weber and Santa Fe Trails will ultimately "embarrass" the Court. Lower federal courts have already begun developing theories to make the
two compatible. For example, one court has said that a white's discrimination case is not the
"mirror image" of a black's. Instead:
A different analysis must be made when the claimants are not members of a class historically subjected to discrimination. When claims are brought by members of a group
formerly subjected to discrimination the case moves with the grain of the Constitution and
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The merits of the issue also are illuminated by Justice Blackmun's opinion
as augmented by Justice Reehnquist's dissent. Rehnquist points out that
Weber's employer had been "under pressure from the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance to increase minority representation at its various plants ....",,
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), as it now is
known, enforces the equal employment and affirmative action programs under
Executive Order 11246. 5 7 The programs apply to federal contractors and suppliers and are enforceable by refusal to award and cancellation of federal contracts and other remedies s that are more sweeping than making mere reparation to individual employees. Hence, the employer and unions had reason to
be nervous. Within this context, Justice Blackmun, borrowing from Judge
Wisdom's opinion, would allow a union and an employer to agree upon a plan
to erase the effects of "arguable violations" without incurring "fear of liability
to whites."59 Blackmun supports this theory, as follows:
Preferential hiring along the lines of the Kaiser program is a reasonable
response for the employer, whether or not a court, on these facts, could
order the same step as a remedy. The company is able to avoid identifying victims of past discrimination, and so avoids claims for back pay that
would inevitably follow a response limited to such victims. If past victims
should be benefited by the
program, however, the company mitigates its
60
liability to those persons.
The Justice continued:
While the "arguable violation" standard is conceptually satisfying, in
practice the emphasis would be on "arguable" rather than on "violation." The great difficulty in the District Court was that no one had any
incentive to prove that Kaiser had violated the Act. Neither Kaiser nor
the Steelworkers wanted to establish a past violation, nor did Weber.
The blacks harmed had never sued and so had no established representative. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission declined to intervene and cannot be expected to intervene in every case of this nature.
To make the "arguable violation" standard work, it would have to be set
low enough to permit the employer to prove it without obligating himself to pay a damage award. The inevitable tendency would be to avoid
hair-splitting litigation by simply concluding that a mere disparity benational policy. A suit which seeks to prevent public action designed.to alleviate the effects
of past discrimination moves against the grain, and the official actions complained of must
be subjected to the analysis prescribed in Weber and the plurality opinion in Bakke which
we find controlling. (Italics added).
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
One can imagine what the late Justice Douglas would have said about the idea that the
Constitution has "grain" running in one direction for one class of people and in a different
direction for others.
56. 99 S. Ct. at 2737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. 80 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (as amended).
58. Exec. Order No. 11,246, Subpart D, §209(a), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Other remedies
include publication of names of violators, recommendations for Title VII action, and recommendations for criminal action.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

60. Id.
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tween the racial composition of the employer's work force and the composition of the qualified local labor force would be an "arguable
violation," even though actual liability could not be established on that
ground alone. 61
Blackmun's proposal is enticing because it acknowledges past discrimination, thereby clinging to an accepted grounds of legitimacy, and also offers a
remedy that is more peaceable and less costly than Title VII and section 1981
litigation. Its weakness is its bluntness: some innocents are bound to be hurt
because of their race in favor of other innocents that had been personally discriminated against.
Having refused to adopt the "arguable violation" doctrine, the Court provides no occasion to weigh its merits except in comparison to the prevailing
Weber "disparity of labor force" approach. This calls for some speculation
about what effects Weber will have in the employment world. First, it seems
unlikely that employers and unions will rush to set up Weber-like programs
just because it seems like a good and fair thing to do. Even the majority
opinion warned against this when it said "Title VII's prohibition ...does
not condemn all private, voluntary, race conscious plans."6 2 Presumably, some
are condemned. More to the point, however, is the fact that the white majority
of most unions and work forces would resent such a high handed approach and
back-lash against it. I believe most black workers would resent it, too. If this
is true, then Weber will be felt mainly where there is an imbalance in the
racial [gender or ethnic] composition of work forces vis-a-vis the community
population. Where this exists, pressures from two sources will be applied. One
will be demands of blacks [or other minority classes] that their unions bargain
with employers to institute Weber-like programs. A union's refusal to accede to
those demands will result in breach-of-duty-of-fair-representation unfair labor
practice charges.6 3 If a union does accede, however, and an employer refuses to
bargain on the point, then union charges of refusal-to-bargain unfair labor
practices will ensue.64 In any case, Weber is steeped with potential for transferring the most difficult discrimination cases away from the EEOC, the specialized
agency created to handle them, and the federal district courts to the National
Labor Relations Board and the federal circuit courts of appeal.
The second source of pressure will be the federal bureacracy, namely the
EEOC, the OFCCP, the Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS), and all federal
departments that administer programs of federal financial assistance to nonfederal agencies and institutions. Weber gives the EEOC a persuasive new tool
to make employers more compliant as it carries out Title VII's policy of seeking conciliation before suit.65 The Weber solution offers a new compromise, in
effect, and might often be accepted, as it was by Kaiser. It takes the heat off the
employer, mollifies the blacks who may actually be entitled to more than they
61. Id. at 2733.
62. Id. at 2730 (emphasis added).
63. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) (action under National Labor Relations Act).

64. See National Labor Relations Act §8(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(5) (1976).
65.

Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(b), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (1976).
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get, and provides a scapegoat explanation to disgruntled whites. On balance,
this might be a good thing. However, the more subtle and sweeping roles of
the OFCCP, ORS, and federal assistance agencies must also be considered.
Those offices have the authority to cut off the flow of federal funds to private
67
contractors doing business with government,8 8 to state and local governments
receiving revenue shares and grants and, to schools, universities, hospitals, and
other agencies that receive federal monies. 68 Unlike Title VII and section 1981
that require an adjudicated violation before remedies may be mandated, the
powers of these agencies may be used to cut off funds administratively, leaving
it to denied recipients to prove themselves right, in effect, after the fact.
The big winners in Weber are the federal bureacrats. Hidden from the
spotlights that fall on litigation and legislation and harboring powers that
work quicker and cut deeper than either of them, these bureaucrats are infused
by Weber with a new supply of unguarded power- much more than would
have flowed from Justice Blackmun's "arguable violation" doctrine. Under
Weber as it stands, the bureaucrats will say: "A work force imbalance exists shape up a la Weber, or else." 69 With Blackmun's approach, the employer
could at least have responded, "I deny any arguable violation; prove me
wrong before you punish me."
Herein is another fallacy of the majority. According to its opinion the
"plan does not involve state action." Perhaps in a technical sense it was correct in Weber's case, but the result is to cede a massive amount of virtually
unregulated power to the federal bureaucracy. The powers of government have
been enhanced and the liberties of the people have been weakened. Weber is
wrong on that score.
Even worse than this is the unhappy realization that laws may be made that
allow for race conscious decisions in the absence of proven or admitted past
wrongs. I acknowledge, of course, that this is not what the Weber majority said
it was doing - it said that Title VII left certain behavior unregulated. Nevertheless, the public will perceive Weber as sanctioning race conscious decisions.
In this respect, the Weber majority opinion revives the spectre of the Court's
1895 opinion in Plessey v. Ferguson.7o There, the majority approved a law that
separated the black and white races into presumably equal compartments for
railroad riding purposes, saying:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races - a distinction which is founded in the color of the
two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color - has no tendency to destroy the
66. OFCCP administers Exec. Order No. 11,246. See, OFCCP Order on Compliance Agency
Responsibility, Oct. 1, 1977. 8 FAro EMPL. PRAc. (BNA) 401:661 (1977).
67. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 §122, 31 U.S.C. §1221 (1976).
68. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §2000(d) (1976).
69. That this was the bureacracy's modus operandi is borne out by the facts in Illinois
Tool Works v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1979). In that case the court ordered OFCCP
not to debar a contractor from future contracts or to publish its name in a list of violators
until after there has been a hearing on the merits of the charges.

70. 163 US. 537 (1895).
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legal equality
of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary
7
servitude. '
The hatred, injustice, bloodshed, and even death wrought by that opinion
are beyond calculation and, even today, are being perpetrated. Perhaps those
things were unseen, but the majority of Plessey no more went without warning
than the majority of Weber went without Justice Douglas's warning quoted
above. Indeed, the first Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a rebuke, in dissent, that
72
eloquently states why the law must be color-blind:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings
or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved. It is therefore, to be regretted that this high
tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has
reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious
as the decision made by this tribunal in the
78
Dred Scott Case.
One may doubt that Weber 74 will be the disaster that Dred Scott v. Sandford75 was. Weber is too limited and other forces countervail it. Yet, I fear it
will increase the "arrogance" of the white race, as Mr. Justice Harlan implicitly
predicted Plessey would, and Mr. Justice Douglas later asserted that it had,76
and will necessarily have some belittling effect on the black race. This result is
71. Id. at 543.
72. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 560.
74. As of January 1980, Weber has been applied in few court decisions. In Edmondson v.
U.S. Steel Corp., - F. Supp. -, 20 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 1745 (N.D. Ala. 1979), it was
extended to prefer women to white men, but in Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F. Supp.
1084 (S.D. Cal. 1979), the court refused to extend Weber to the ad hoc rejection of males in
favor of blacks and women where there was no plan of affirmative action. Accord, Cleary v.
Dept. of Public Welfare, - F. Supp. -, 21 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 687 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Tangern v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 21 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 570 (D. Nev.
1979) appeared to apply Weber to approve an affirmative action plan where there was no
proof of prior discrimination by the defendent employer, who was an independent contractor
providing services to the government. According to the court, "the facts ... do indicate that
minorities were traditionally excluded from guard conditions under contract with the Nevada
Operations Office of the AEC and its successor federal agencies, and that is enough." Id. at
575. With that finding it is doubtful that Weber is needed to justify a corrective remedy.
75. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
76. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
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wrong in its assumption about racial differences, morally wrong, and legally
regrettable.
APPROPRuATE CONTEXT AND LimnTs OF AFFimATIVE

ArION

What is the constitutional issue that the Court did not face up to in Weber?
Simply this - are the equal protection mandates of the fourteenth amendment
violated if a State (or the fifth amendment if the United States) should single
out an innocent white person and deprive him of an economic opportunity on
the basis of his race alone in favor of a black person who has no better and,
perhaps, lesser job credentials and who has not himself been the target of
discrimination?
As previously noted,77 my colleagues, Judge Wisdom, and the Weber majority all legitimate such a subordination of individual rights on grounds of
social justice. My colleagues,78 however, go beyond mere justification to dissolve
the problem by a redefinition of the concept of racial discrimination in constitutional context. This they do in the course of criticizing Justice Powell's

de-breaking opinion in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke 79 case,
to be discussed below, saying:
One of the major problems we detect in Mr. Justice Powell's influential
opinion.., is the analytical and empirical inadequacy with which he
handles the specific concept of "racial discrimination." He has (1) abstracted... individual concepts out of the historic and contemporary
facts from which they derive meaning for policy-making purposes, and
(2) handled them first as separate concepts for the purpose of evaluating
the normative and practical basis of the [affirmative action] program,
then fused them in order to substantiate the assumed effectiveness of
Bakke's claims without providing any explanation of what "racial discrimination" means for the purpose of that claim.80
I confess that I really do not know what that verbose statement means, but
suspect that it implies that the Constitution means something different for
blacks than whites. However humane that notion may seem to be as a matter
of social justice, it cannot be supported as a constitutional principle, and,
indeed, carries with it implicit connotations of racial inferiority that in the
view of Mr. Justice Douglas would imprint "a stamp of inferiority that a State
is not permitted to place on any person." ' Hence, I sharply disagree with the
argument and find substantial authority to support me. For example, no less
a liberal than Justice Douglas spoke directly to this point in a precisely
analogous context, saying:
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The years
of slavery did more than retard the progress of Blacks. Even a greater
wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of humility and
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See text accompanying notes 1-24 supra.
Baldwin & Nagan, supranote 1, at 857.
438 U.S. 265. See notes 84-89 infra and accompanying text.
Baldwin & Nagan, supranote 1, at 857.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race. A [person]
who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he
subject to any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race,
he has a constitutional right to have his application considered on the
merits in a racially neutral manner.8 2
Hewing to that line, the majority of the Supreme Court recently affirmed that
the Constitution protects white people against discrimination just as it protects
black people.8 3 Indeed, the contrary position would be a legal travesty and the
cruelest and most unjust act of discrimination yet visited upon black people.
What could be more ignoble than a decree of constitutional stature that
persons of one race were forever to receive the parens patriae of the State because of some debilitating inferiority? That imports a conclusion about racial
differences that has not been and, I believe, cannot be proven. It is implicit in
the point of view that my colleagues wrongly, but I believe quite innocently,
espouse. It also is implicit in the Weber majority opinion. Rejecting it, as I
do, I must necessarily conclude that if affirmative action is justified, it is for
only so long as the effects of past discrimination still ramify strongly. This, of
course, reflects the fundamental transience of the remedy.
Turning away from the employment context in which the constitutional
question can be side-stepped, I will complete my analysis by examining
whether or not affirmative action can be constitutionally applied in selecting
members of entering classes of professional schools and other state supported
educational programs. By the slender majority of Justice Powell's regrettable
concurring opinion, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke4 held
that it could be done in proper circumstances. Let me emphasize that I deem
Powell's opinion to be regrettable, not because of its approval of affirmative
action, which I agree with in the Bakke context, but because of the unfortunate
grounds upon which he relied. Straightforward equal protection jurisprudence
strikes a balance between the intrusions upon the individual rights of claimants and the competing state interests expressed in the intruding program.
82. Id.
83. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Reviewing the history
of post civil war civil rights legislation, the Supreme Court concluded:
This cumulative evidence of congressional intent makes clear, we think, that the 1866
statute, designed to protect the "same right.., to make and enforce contracts" of "citizens
of every race and color" was not understood or intended to be reduced ... to the protection solely of nonwhites. Rather, the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race.
Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens would encounter substantial
racial discrimination of the sort proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure and
legislative history persuade us that the Thirty-ninth Congress was intent upon establishing
in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the
particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves. And while the statutory
language has been somewhat streamlined in re-enactment and codification, there is no
indication that §1981 is intended to provide any less than the Congress enacted in 1866
regarding racial discrimination against white persons. . . . Thus, we conclude that the
District Court erred in dismissing petitioners' claims under §1981 on the ground that the
protections of that provision are unavailable to white persons. Id. at 295-96.
84. 438 U.S. 2733 (1978).
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How the issue might be resolved without resorting to Powell's unfortunate
localized focus or my colleagues' color conscious view of the Constitution can
be demonstrated by applying tried-and-true constitutional tests8 5 to the question of special admissions (affirmative action), using the University of Florida
College of Law as an example. That there was a history of racial discrimination
in admission to law schools in Florida cannot be refuted.88 Therefore, the first
criterion for the application of affirmative action is satisfied. That it is a
compelling interest of the state to take extraordinary measures to eradicate
the effects of that discrimination must now be shown. This I would do as follows. First, I would adduce statistics to show that black people make up about
13 percent of the population of Florida;8 7 whereas, black lawyers make up less
than 1 percent of the population of the Florida Bar.88 Then, I would argue,
given the history of discrimination, that the State has a compelling interest to
make adequate legal representation available to black citizens and to remove
85. The Supreme Court applies different standards of justification to test the constitutional validity of discriminatory governmental acts depending upon the nature of the interest
that is being infringed. Although a careful analysis of all equal protection cases would probably reveal a shifting standard in the nature of a continuum, most equal protection cases can
be at least roughly categorized as applying one of three discrete standards. One is the so-called
"rational basis" standard which applies to general economic and social classifications, such as
classifications in tax laws and zoning regulations. Treating different classifications differently
will not be invalidated as a deprivation of equal protection so long as the distinctions are
rationally justified, even though the reviewing court itself does not agree with the policy
choices inherent in the classifications. In these matters legislative policy choices are largely
undisturbed by the courts and given only cursory review. On the other extreme is the "compelling state interest test" that is applied when a classification is made on the basis of a socalled suspect class or results in the deprivation of a fundamental liberty. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that race, religion and national origin are suspect classes; whereas, freedom
of speech and the right to vote are fundamental interests. Whenever one of these classes or
interests is trenched upon, the Supreme Court will give the matter "close scrutiny." If a
discriminatory program is to be sustained, the state must not only demonstrate a compelling
state interest but also show that it can be met through no less intrusive measure. Dozens of
cases could be cited to support each of these points. One of the most succinct summaries is
found in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93 (1979). Suspended in the
shadows somewhere between suspect classes and economic regulations is the standard applied
when a discrimination is made on account of sex. So far, a majority of justices of the Supreme
Court has refused to denominate sex as a suspect class, thereby not only throwing the validity
of such programs into an unusually bad state of confusion but also, incidentally, fueling the
pro-equal rights amendment forces. As a result, programs which make sex based distinctions
require even more careful analysis than those involving suspect classes because the range of
possible considerations is greater. The latest of a series of cases on this point is Davis v.
Passman, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (1979).
86. Rarely can there be found such a clear trail to prove an assertion. See Little, The
United States Supreme Court and Land Use Regulation: The Latest Round, 52 TUL. L. R.v.
476,508 n.148 (1978).
87. As of July 1, 1978, the total population of Florida is 8,966,895 of which 7,760,726 are
white and 1,205,669 are blacks. U. OF FLA. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEAR6H,
FLORIDA STATLTCAL

A.rpucrs 25 (1979) (Table 1.28).

88. The Florida Bar Association membership is 25,434. 54 FLA. B.J. 5 (1980). While the
Florida Bar Association keeps no records by race it is estimated that there are between 250
and 800 black attorneys licensed to practice in Florida. Telephonic interview with Warren
Dawson, Esquire, President, Florida Division, The National Bar Association. (Jan. 14, 1980).
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doubt from the minds of prospective black students that the legal profession
is open to black people in Florida. Because white lawyers can provide adequate
representation to black people (not that they necessarily do), the latter point
is much more important than the former. Without reason to believe that the
legal profession is open to them, black people are left to believe that a prime
avenue for entry into the economic, intellectual, and social mainstream of the
State is to be forever denied them. Stamping out that reality is a compelling
state goal.
To complete the argument I must establish that no means less intrusive
upon the rights of innocent people is available to accomplish the task. Clearly,
the problem could be solved by simply expanding legal educational facilities
until every student that wanted to attend a law school could do so. That is set
aside on grounds that there is not enough money to solve all governmental
problems of comparable weight by that means. Hence, other solutions must be
sought. Nevertheless, I can use a slight variation of the expansion-of-facilities
remedy to expose the bitter paradox that would result if affirmative action were
not approved. By expansion, we could provide legal education to black people
by establishing a separate law school for black students. Then, nobody would
have to fuss with interracial differences in entrance examination scores and the
like. No one would accept this of course, because it is a plain reincarnation of
the separate-but-equal mentality of Plessey v. Ferguson, 9 which is exactly what
Brown v. Board of Education9- promised to wipe out. There cannot be enough
irony in the soul of the nation to tolerate a reversal on this point. Hence, if
affirmative action is to be denied, we leave prospective black students with this
result:
Brown v. Board of Education not only eliminated the inferior legal education that the State made available to you, but it also eliminated any
chance at all for a legal education and a career in the legal profession.
That result simply cannot be tolerated as a matter of State policy. Nothing less
drastic than special admissions has been proposed. In sum, the predicate is
proven; the interest is compelling and the means is supportable. So-called
special admission programs can stand the test of constitutional validity, at least
in places like Florida, even though the basis for it is only general deprivation
and identifiable innocent people fall victims to it at the point of entry into an
educational system.
Nevertheless, one cannot wisely depart from the consideration of such a
sensitive point as this upon reaching the simple conclusion that the measure is
justified on occasion. The most important policy question is not "should there
be affirmative action," but is, "when should it end?" The former question was
decided and implemented years ago, now we are merely arguing about whether
we were constitutionally correct in doing so. In employment, the measure is

89.
90.

163 U.S. 537 (1896). See notes 70-76 supra and accompanying text.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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remedial in nature and rests primarily upon a history of social ostracism. 91 By
nature, it is necessarily self-limiting. Its own successes cut away its justification.
Although this analysis demonstrates that affirmative action is essentially a
transient phenomenon, it is well worth emphasizing that anti-discrimination
measures against present specific and general deprivation are not transient,
but must be constantly maintained in order to prevent the rebirth of disadvantaged classes. The law must be applied to make economic opportunities
available to all people without discrimination on impermissible grounds.
This is not the place to say when or even how to determine when affirmative
action measures must end. Brown v. Board of Education92 has passed its
quarter-century anniversary and its constitutional promises still have not been
fully redeemed. Yet, only a false blindness would lead one to conclude that
tremendous strides have not been made. No Southerner maturing from childhood to adulthood since Brown was decided would deny that changes have
occurred. Still, our culture has not yet so changed that the time has come to
end affirmative action in the selection of entering classes for professional
schools, and, perhaps, in other places as well. On the average, black applicants
do less well on the entry tests than white applicants. 93 On the other hand, black
students who enter on special admissions programs do well on the whole, graduate, and, so far as I know, perform ably in the profession. Given an opportunity in law school, these young men and women overcome whatever disadvantages racial discrimination stigmatizes them within their formative years.
As the years pass, and the effects of Brown are more thoroughly assimilated
into the elementary and secondary school systems, the time will come when the
basis of affirmative action will have simply disappeared.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has expressed an opinion about occupational testing that may lay a trap to defeat the expectations of prospective disadvantaged students if affirmative action programs are lifted too soon. As is
well known, admissions to professional schools are strongly dependent upon
performances on specialized, machine scored aptitude tests. Much controversy
remains as to whether or not these tests are "culturally biased" to discriminate
against persons who do not come from a middle-class white background. Mr.
Justice Douglas also warned of the pernicious effects of such biased tests in his
94
dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard.
So far, the Court has not concerned itself
greatly with cultural bias but it has examined questions of occupational rel91. On this point I am in apparent agreement with my colleagues. See Baldwin & Nagan,
supra note 1, at 860-63.
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. For example "the failure rate among black students was approximately 10 times that
among white students" on the functional literacy test administered to high school students
in all Florida's public high schools. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 249 (M.D.
Fla. 1979). IQ tests administered to public secondary school children in California assigned a
disproportionately large number of black children into an educable mentally retarded class.
Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
Further, blacks "scored an average of 119 points lower on the verbal section and 134 points
lower than whites on the mathematics section" of the Scholastic Aptitude Test over a five
year period. 19 CHRON. HIcME EDuc. 5 (Jan. 7, 1980).

94. 416 U.S. 312, 334 (1974). See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra, and note 98 infra.
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evance in detail. For example, do specialized admission tests predict success in
the practice of a profession closely enough to justify their use?
In the enforcement of Title VII the above question was raised where employers were using intelligence tests to make routine employment decisions.
Such tests often proved to be engines of discrimination because they favored
better educated people but did not predict which applicant would perform
best in the job he was seeking. Because of discrimination, southern whites
generally were better educated than southern blacks. Thus, the tests favored
whites.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court drove home the point that Title VII
mandates that employment tests be "job related"95 and so certified by persons
of suitable professional competence.9 6 Hence, this form of job discrimination
was quieted, at least so far as entry into blue collar jobs is concerned. Unfortunately, however, the Court inexplicably slipped away from the jobrelatedness criterion in Washington v. Davis, 97 a case involving an admission
test administered to prospective applicants of a police academy. To be hired
by the District of Columbia police force required graduation from the academy
and to be admitted to the academy required success on the admission test. The
cascading of requirements is parallel to that facing an entrant into the legal
profession: law school admission test, law school examinations, bar examinations; and, the bar. To be stopped at the beginning is final. Basing his judgment on prior cases, one would have predicted that the Court would require
the academy admissions test to be predictive of performance as a police officer.
Such a prediction would have been wrong; Washington v. Davis held that the
test concerns itself only with prediction of performance in the academy. Thus,
the job related criterion was badly eroded.
Although Washington v. Davis does not prevent examining the motive behind any particular admission program, it does appear to remove from administrators the burden of proof as to whether or not entry tests, such as the
law school admission test, are predictive of success in the practice of a profession. This is regrettable, because, if for no other reason, it will extend the time
affirmative action must continue. Changing basic social institutions so as to
provide ample opportunity for equal intellectual development without regard
to race is one thing. Changing it so as to acquaint everyone with everyone
else's cultural quirks is another. Hence, a consequence of Washington v. Davis
may be to leave educational institutions on their own to rectify deficiencies that
may exist in standardized tests. As Justice Douglas said, "The key to the problem is consideration of... applications in a racially neutral way. Abolition of
the LSAT would be a start."98 If the schools themselves do nothing, the need
95. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
97. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
98. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 341 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
goes so far as to reject the compelling state interest justification of affirmative action, saying:
The argument is that a "compelling" state interest can easily justify the racial discrimination that is practiced here. To many "compelling" would give members of one race even
more than pro rata representation. The public payrolls might then be deluged say with
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for affirmative action may continue for a long while.99
The performance of the United States Supreme Court in matters of discrimination drew criticism from liberal commentators0 ° prior to Weber. Perhaps, the Court has been conservative and too insensitive to the continued
effects of discrimination, past and present, but perhaps it has also perceived
that affirmative action must be a limited and not a permanent measure. Even
the Weber majority said:
[t]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential
selection will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers
in the [Kaiser's] plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force. 01
Perhaps the Court was correct when, through the years, it refused to review
cases in which lower federal courts handed down affirmative action remedies.
The Court may not have wanted to say prematurely what must be said
eventually. Despite Weber, the Court may now take those cases and render
opinions that would have been conservative and, perhaps, very damaging had
they come a few years ago. Perhaps, now is the time to place affirmative action
in its correct perspective. In a sense, it is an antidote for a pathology that has
infected the body social. Taking medicine is distasteful. Knowing that it is
necessary, but only temporary, can make it go down smoother.
Chicanos because they are as a group the poorest of the poor and need work more than
others, leaving desperately poor individual blacks and whites without employment. By the
same token large quotas of blacks or browns could be added to the Bar, waiving examinations required of other groups, so that it would be better racially balanced. The State,
however, may not proceed by racial classification to force strict population equivalencies
for every group in every occupation, overriding individual preferences. The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to
satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. The purpose of the University
of Washington cannot be to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles,
Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for
Americans and not to place First Amendment barriers against anyone. Id.
99. I might also observe, that to produce a professional school admission test that is
predictive of performance in the profession instead of performance in school is not a trivial
job. Little work toward such achievement has been undertaken.
100. Baldwin & Nagan, supranote 1 is prototypical.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 2750.
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